| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| When folding a long comment in an email header containing exclusively unfoldable characters, the parenthesis would not be preserved. This could be used for injecting headers into email messages where addresses are user-controlled and not sanitized. |
| User-controlled header names and values containing newlines can allow injecting HTTP headers. |
| User-controlled data URLs parsed by urllib.request.DataHandler allow injecting headers through newlines in the data URL mediatype. |
| The imaplib module, when passed a user-controlled command, can have additional commands injected using newlines. Mitigation rejects commands containing control characters. |
| The poplib module, when passed a user-controlled command, can have
additional commands injected using newlines. Mitigation rejects commands
containing control characters. |
| When using http.cookies.Morsel, user-controlled cookie values and parameters can allow injecting HTTP headers into messages. Patch rejects all control characters within cookie names, values, and parameters. |
| When loading a plist file, the plistlib module reads data in size specified by the file itself, meaning a malicious file can cause OOM and DoS issues |
| When building nested elements using xml.dom.minidom methods such as appendChild() that have a dependency on _clear_id_cache() the algorithm is quadratic. Availability can be impacted when building excessively nested documents. |
| When reading an HTTP response from a server, if no read amount is specified, the default behavior will be to use Content-Length. This allows a malicious server to cause the client to read large amounts of data into memory, potentially causing OOM or other DoS. |
| The 'zipfile' module would not check the validity of the ZIP64 End of
Central Directory (EOCD) Locator record offset value would not be used to
locate the ZIP64 EOCD record, instead the ZIP64 EOCD record would be
assumed to be the previous record in the ZIP archive. This could be abused
to create ZIP archives that are handled differently by the 'zipfile' module
compared to other ZIP implementations.
Remediation maintains this behavior, but checks that the offset specified
in the ZIP64 EOCD Locator record matches the expected value. |
| If the value passed to os.path.expandvars() is user-controlled a
performance degradation is possible when expanding environment
variables. |
| During an address list folding when a separating comma ends up on a folded line and that line is to be unicode-encoded then the separator itself is also unicode-encoded. Expected behavior is that the separating comma remains a plan comma. This can result in the address header being misinterpreted by some mail servers. |
| There is a defect in the CPython “tarfile” module affecting the “TarFile” extraction and entry enumeration APIs. The tar implementation would process tar archives with negative offsets without error, resulting in an infinite loop and deadlock during the parsing of maliciously crafted tar archives.
This vulnerability can be mitigated by including the following patch after importing the “tarfile” module: https://gist.github.com/sethmlarson/1716ac5b82b73dbcbf23ad2eff8b33e1 |
| A vulnerability has been found in the CPython `venv` module and CLI where path names provided when creating a virtual environment were not quoted properly, allowing the creator to inject commands into virtual environment "activation" scripts (ie "source venv/bin/activate"). This means that attacker-controlled virtual environments are able to run commands when the virtual environment is activated. Virtual environments which are not created by an attacker or which aren't activated before being used (ie "./venv/bin/python") are not affected. |
| There is a LOW severity vulnerability affecting CPython, specifically the
'http.cookies' standard library module.
When parsing cookies that contained backslashes for quoted characters in
the cookie value, the parser would use an algorithm with quadratic
complexity, resulting in excess CPU resources being used while parsing the
value. |
| There is a MEDIUM severity vulnerability affecting CPython.
The
email module didn’t properly quote newlines for email headers when
serializing an email message allowing for header injection when an email
is serialized. |
| There is a MEDIUM severity vulnerability affecting CPython.
Regular expressions that allowed excessive backtracking during tarfile.TarFile header parsing are vulnerable to ReDoS via specifically-crafted tar archives. |
| The “ipaddress” module contained incorrect information about whether certain IPv4 and IPv6 addresses were designated as “globally reachable” or “private”. This affected the is_private and is_global properties of the ipaddress.IPv4Address, ipaddress.IPv4Network, ipaddress.IPv6Address, and ipaddress.IPv6Network classes, where values wouldn’t be returned in accordance with the latest information from the IANA Special-Purpose Address Registries.
CPython 3.12.4 and 3.13.0a6 contain updated information from these registries and thus have the intended behavior. |
| An issue was found in the CPython `zipfile` module affecting versions 3.12.1, 3.11.7, 3.10.13, 3.9.18, and 3.8.18 and prior.
The zipfile module is vulnerable to “quoted-overlap” zip-bombs which exploit the zip format to create a zip-bomb with a high compression ratio. The fixed versions of CPython makes the zipfile module reject zip archives which overlap entries in the archive.
|
| Allows arbitrary filesystem writes outside the extraction directory during extraction with filter="data".
You are affected by this vulnerability if using the tarfile module to extract untrusted tar archives using TarFile.extractall() or TarFile.extract() using the filter= parameter with a value of "data" or "tar". See the tarfile extraction filters documentation https://docs.python.org/3/library/tarfile.html#tarfile-extraction-filter for more information.
Note that for Python 3.14 or later the default value of filter= changed from "no filtering" to `"data", so if you are relying on this new default behavior then your usage is also affected.
Note that none of these vulnerabilities significantly affect the installation of source distributions which are tar archives as source distributions already allow arbitrary code execution during the build process. However when evaluating source distributions it's important to avoid installing source distributions with suspicious links. |
